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Abstract: Cloud storage is a cheap and reliable solution for users to share data with their contacts. However, the
lack of standardisation and migration tools makes it difficult for users to migrate to another Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) without losing contacts, thus resulting in a vendor lock-in problem. In this work, we aim
at providing a generic framework, named PortableCloud, that is flexible enough to enable users to migrate
seamlessly to a different CSP keeping all their data and contacts. To preserve privacy of users, the data in
the portable cloud is concealed from the CSP by employing encryption techniques. Moreover, we introduce a
migration agent that assists users in automatically finding a suitable CSP that can satisfy their needs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is a cheap and reliable alterna-
tive to a local storage system. A Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) is considered to ensure availability of
cloud services so that users can get access to their
data from anywhere at any time. Data in the cloud
is stored at geographically dispersed locations, thus
raising serious privacy concerns. Assuming that the
CSP is honest-but-curious (De Capitani di Vimercati
et al., 2008), data has to be kept confidential.
Many CSPs allow their users to share data with
each other, which is a great way to collaborate with
third parties. For example, Dropbox1 enables users
to share files between each other. However, sharing
data with users who do not belong to the same CSP is
usually limited and less secure and requires a manual
token or key exchange with third parties. Through-
out this paper, we call third parties contacts, i.e., the
parties with whom users shares their data.
There are various reasons why a user may want to
migrate her data from one CSP to another one. For
example, if there are cheaper CSPs available, the ser-
vice condition have changed or the current service is
not reliable enough. Furthermore, there are jurisdic-
tional restrictions on the CSP (Joint et al., 2009). In
the worst case, a CSP might have to shut down its ser-
vices for financial or legal issues. For instance, if a
CSP is used for illegal file sharing, the CSP may face
legal issues and its service may get interrupted. For
1https://www.dropbox.com/
innocent users, this can lead to loss of their personal
data.
Having contacts at a certain CSP can be a hin-
drance for a user to migrate to another CSP since these
contacts would then be lost, i.e., a user and a con-
tact would not be able to access and share data with
each other anymore. Another problem that makes it
hard to migrate a cloud service is that there is often
a lack of tools for a seamless migration. For exam-
ple, there is no simple way to migrate data between
CSPs when data needs to be transformed to a differ-
ent format or encryption scheme. These problems that
could stop users from migrating to a different CSP are
also known as vendor lock-in (Armbrust et al., 2010;
De Chaves et al., 2011; Satzger et al., 2013).
In this paper, we propose PortableCloud, an ar-
chitecture that targets the problem of vendor lock-ins
and allows users to seamlessly migrate data between
CSPs that run PortableCloud. If required, data can
even be removed from the cloud and migrated to a
local service that runs PortableCloud. Data can be
shared between contacts that reside either at the same
or a different CSP (see Figure 3). To preserve pri-
vacy of users, data is stored encrypted and can only be
accessed by authorised parties. When migrating the
portable cloud to a new CSP, all contacts are kept and
automatically notified about the migration, i.e., the
migration is transparent to users and their contacts.
We provide a migration cost analysis of the portable
cloud migration. Further, we propose an agent that
informs users about CSPs with better conditions in
order to help them to migrate to a new CSP.
Our contributions can be summarised as follows:
• A proposal of a novel privacy-preserving portable
cloud architecture PortableCloud that enables
seamless migration to a new CSP while maintain-
ing all existing contacts.
• A cost analysis of a portable cloud migration.
• A migration agent that assists users in migrating
to another CSP.
2 SYSTEMMODEL
A user of a CSP stores all her data at the CSP. Data
at the CSP can be shared with contacts. Contacts are
users of the same or different CSPs. In our system
model, we assume the following entities:
• Cloud Service Provider (CSP): It is responsible
to store the data and run the PortableCloud soft-
ware. The CSP ensures that only authorised par-
ties can access the data. Furthermore, the CSP
manages the communication between users and
their contacts.
• User or Organisation: It is an entity that owns
the data managed by the CSP and regulates ac-
cess to the data by deploying access policies at
the CSP. It is a client of the CSP. In case of an or-
ganisation, there could be an administrator. How-
ever, in case of individuals, we do not distinguish
between an administrator and a user. The user is
responsible for the encryption of the data before
storing it in the cloud.
• Contact: A contact is a party that can access data
at the user’s CSP according to an access policy
defined by the user. Contacts are users of the same
or of a different CSP.
Data at the CSP could be stored in any format.
It could be managed in files or there could be a
database. We assume that the CSP is honest-but-
curious (De Capitani di Vimercati et al., 2008). This
means the user cannot trust the CSP to provide confi-
dentiality. For this reason, the user encrypts confiden-
tial data locally to prevent the CSP to gain cleartext
access to this data. The user encrypts data using a
secure symmetric key encryption algorithm, such as
AES.
To be able to securely communicate with contacts,
each user has a set of key pairs for asymmetric cryp-
tography. These are signing keys and verification keys
for digital signatures and public keys and private keys
for public key encryption.
3 PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide an overview of the
technical details of PortableCloud. We point out pos-
sible solutions and techniques to implement a portable
cloud.
Figure 1: PortableCloud: A user stores data at the CSP in
an encrypted way. Only authorised contacts get access to
the data at the CSP. The user and her contacts can exchange
commands through their CSPs.
Figure 1 depicts PortableCloud. In PortableCloud,
the core system entities include a CSP, users, their
contacts (and the CSPs of contacts).
3.1 Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
A CSP is responsible to store the data. It also reg-
ulates access to the data if a contact satisfies access
policy specified by the user. The user interacts with
the CSP through a client such as a desktop, a mobile
app or a web page. The CSP mainly consists of three
main components including User Data, Access Man-
ager and Command Dispatcher.
User Data. The user data is the core entity at the
CSP that holds all the data of a single user. It also
contains information the CSP needs to operate, e.g., it
includes the access policy that is deployed to regulate
access to the data. As we describe later, this simpli-
fies the migration process since the user data is largely
decoupled from the CSP. All sensitive elements of the
user data are encrypted using the symmetric key en-
cryption algorithm while each element uses a separate
symmetric key. The user data contains the following
sub-components.
Data Storage. The data storage is a repository to
store the data. Typically, it could be a database, a file
system or a combination of both. Since the data in
cleartext could compromise privacy of users, data el-
ements (say files) are encrypted using different sym-
metric keys. This increases the security since contacts
can only decrypt these entries for which they possess
the corresponding decryption keys.
Meta Data. The meta data consists of structural
information about the data, e.g., directories and file
names or table and column names of an encrypted
database (Asghar et al., 2013). Furthermore, the meta
data contains integrity and provenance information
for the data stored in the data storage. Entries in the
meta data are encrypted with encryption keys of the
associated data.
Key Store. The key store is used to manage and
store cryptographic keys at the CSP. It is important
to note that all secret cryptographic keys are stored
securely in an encrypted manner. Only the user can
access the key store and get access to the keys using
a password. This prevents the CSP accessing secret
keys (Ferretti et al., 2014). Thus, having access to the
keys in the key store enables the user to decrypt all
user data stored at the CSP.
We consider that keys in the key store are en-
crypted with a symmetric master key. This master
key, which could be realised as a role key, is stored
encrypted as well. The master key can be decrypted
by deriving a user key from the user’s password using
a Key Derivation Function (KDF) (Josefsson, 2011).
This key chain approach is similar to the one used in
the Linux Unified Key Setup (LUKS)2 or for Box-
cryptor3.
Contacts. This entity contains information about all
contacts known to the user. This information contains
the CSP location of the contacts as well as contacts’
public keys and verification keys. Furthermore, each
contact entry contains information to access and de-
crypt shared data that is located at the contact’s CSP.
All the contact information is stored encrypted.
Access Policy. The access policy specifies what con-
tacts are eligible to access data at the user’s CSP. In
this work, we consider that access policies are readily
available in the cleartext to allow the CSP to regu-
late access to the data. Without loss of generality, in
case of sensitive access policies, we could employ en-
crypted policy enforcement mechanisms, such as (As-
ghar, 2013).
Command Queue. The command queue holds
incoming or outgoing commands. Commands are
generic messages that can be used to communicate re-
quests between a user and her contacts. As discussed
in Section 3.3, using commands, users can communi-
cate securely with their contacts.
2https://gitlab.com/groups/cryptsetup
3https://www.boxcryptor.com
All commands in the incoming command queue
are fetched and handled by the user. Outgoing com-
mands are placed in the outgoing command queue to-
gether with a CSP address of the receiving contact.
The CSP address is stored in cleartext in order to al-
low the CSP to dispatch the command.
Access Manager. The access manager is a sub-
component of the CSP, which ensures that only au-
thorised entities can get access to the data stored at
the CSP. It authenticates users and contacts and pro-
vides access to the requested data, given the deployed
access policies are satisfied.
Command Dispatcher. The command dispatcher
is a sub-component of the CSP that dispatches com-
mands from the outgoing command queue and aims
at delivering them to the target CSP. If a command
has been delivered successfully, it is removed from
the queue. Moreover, this sub-component receives in-
coming commands and places them in the incoming
command queue.
3.2 Account Creation
Once a new user signs up, a signature key pair and an
encryption key pair are generated. Both key pairs are
securely stored in the key store. As already explained
in Section 3.1, a key chain is used, which starts from
the user’s password from which the user client derives
the user key. Using this key chain, users can get ac-
cess to the user data.
For authenticating the user to the CSP, we need
to present user credentials. As a possible solution,
we can use another password (different from one al-
ready mentioned above) but it would require the user
to manage two passwords: one for authentication and
another for decrypting the key chain, thus raising us-
ability concern. To avoid this usability issue, we pro-
pose authenticating using the same password but de-
riving an additional authentication key from it. When
signing up, the user chooses a different set of KDF
parameters, i.e., number of iterations and salt, to gen-
erate the authentication key.
3.3 Command Passing
A user needs a way to communicate with contacts at
the same or different CSPs, say to establish a new con-
tact (Section 3.4) or to share data with a contact (Sec-
tion 3.5). In general, a direct peer-to-peer connection
between the user and a contact is not possible, i.e.,
when the contact is offline. For this reason, the CSP is
used to pass commands between communicating par-
ties.
Figure 2: The user can pass commands to the contact’s CSP.
These commands are handled by fetching them from the
incoming command queue.
To send a command to a contact, the command is
delivered to the contact’s CSP as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. The contact’s CSP puts the command into
the contact’s incoming command queue. In case
the contact’s CSP is not available, the command is
placed into the user’s outgoing command queue and
the user’s CSP aims at delivering the command at a
later time.
Commands are always signed by the sender and
whenever possible encrypted with the public key of
the receiver, i.e., when the public key has been ex-
changed.
3.4 Contact Establishment
Data can be shared with contacts at the same or a dif-
ferent CSP. To establish a link between a user and an
unknown contact, they have to exchange their verifi-
cation keys and public keys. This key exchange could
take place out-of-band, say using PGP (Garfinkel,
1995). Alternatively, we can rely on Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI), where a trust anchor, which is a
root Certificate Authority (CA), issues X.509 certifi-
cates (Burr et al., 1996).
After a successful contact establishment, both the
user and the new contact create a new contact entry in
their contacts databases containing the contact’s keys
and CSP location. The contact entry contains the con-
tact’s keys as well as the CSP location of the contact.
3.5 Data Access and Sharing
Data Access. The user has full access to the user
data by logging into the CSP using her user name and
password (see Section 3.2). However, the access for
contacts needs to be restricted and is managed using
access tokens. The typical frameworks for access to-
kens include OAuth4, OpenID Connect5, where to-
kens are used to provide access to a service.
Typically, an access token is an identifier that is
presented to a service provider to get access to re-
4http://oauth.net
5http://openid.net/connect
quested services or resources. In the traditional ac-
cess token model, there is no way to identify the re-
quester. However, we consider special access tokens
that are used to allow contacts access to specified re-
sources. In the context of portable clouds, access to-
kens consist of two parts: a private signing key and a
public verification key. The public part of the token,
i.e., the verification key, is stored in the user’s access
policy and is mapped to access rights specified in an
Access Control List (ACL). As described later, an eli-
gible contact is in possession of the private part of the
token, i.e., the signing key.
A contact can access data by signing an access re-
quest using the private signing key. If the CSP can
verify the access request using the public verification
key in the ACL then the requested access is granted to
the contact.
Figure 3: Data sharing between a user and her contacts who
may or may not be at the same CSP.
Data Sharing. A user can share data with contacts
located at the same or at a different CSP (see Fig-
ure 3). To access shared data, a contact needs an ac-
cess token and an encryption key to decrypt the data
(see Figure 4).
Figure 4: A contact can access or modify data at a user’s
CSP. Therefore, the contact needs an access token and an
encryption key.
To share data with a contact, the user has to send
the token as well as the encryption key to the contact.
This is done using a secure command as described in
Section 3.3. Moreover, the access rights in the access
policy have to be updated for the used token.
3.6 Data Integrity and Provenance
An important property of a cloud storage is that users
can ensure the integrity of their data stored at the
CSP (Zhao et al., 2010), i.e., detecting if potential at-
tackers have tampered with the data at the CSP. More-
over, if data is shared with a contact and the contact
writes data to the CSP, i.e., modifies, adds or deletes
data, the user may want to ensure that the changes
really originate from a certain contact (Asghar et al.,
2012). On the other hand, when the user writes data,
the user may want to certify that changes indeed origi-
nates from the user. This means not only data integrity
but also data provenance is an important property for
a cloud storage.
To be able to verify data integrity and provenance
a user or contact has to provide integrity and prove-
nance information (Hacigu¨mu¨s¸ et al., 2004). This in-
formation is stored in the meta data entity and can be
accessed by users or contacts who can access the as-
sociated data.
4 MIGRATION
The migration process of PortableCloud consists
of two main steps. First, the user data has to be copied
to the new CSP. Second, all contacts need to be noti-
fied about the new CSP. It is important to ensure that
the migrations should be transparent for the contacts
and there should be a minimal downtime.
Since the user data does not need to be adapted
for the new CSP, the migration can take place through
a direct data transfer between both CSPs. However,
copying a large amount of user data can take a signif-
icant amount of time. For that reason, the data should
be copied gradually. This can be done by first copy-
ing a snapshot of the user data and then successively
copy new changes made during the migration. With
the assumption that new changes are small, the time
to synchronise data with the new CSP during the mi-
gration is small.
One problem that can affect the migration is on-
going write or read transactions that are performed by
contacts. A conservative approach is to block new
changes at the old CSP and wait unless all the data
is migrated. Alternatively, we can imagine more so-
phisticated approaches that are able to handle ongoing
changes during and after the migration.
Once all data is copied to the new CSP, the con-
tacts need to be notified about the migration. This is
done by sending them migration commands that con-
tain the location of the new CSP. A problem that can
occur here is that a contact cannot be reached. One
reason for that could be temporary unavailability of
the contact’s CSP. However, since the migration com-
mand is in the outgoing command queue, the new
CSP will try to deliver the message at a later point.
Another situation when a migration command cannot
be delivered is when the user and a contact both mi-
grate to a new CSP at the same time. In this case, there
is no easy way to determine the CSP location of the
migrating contact. For this reason, the old CSP can
be configured to point to the new CSP location when
contacts try to communicate with the old CSP. One
possible approach is to introduce one or more central
name servers where users can register their CSP loca-
tion.
If a user receives a migration command from a mi-
grated contact, the new contact’s CSP location has to
be updated in the user’s contacts list. Furthermore,
the user has to verify that undelivered outgoing com-
mands to the migrated contact are updated to target
the contact’s new CSP.
4.1 Migration Costs
For enterprises as well as individuals, the costs and
services of a CSP are important. If a preferable CSP
(say based on various factors such as quality of ser-
vice or costs) is available, the user may consider mi-
grating to this CSP.
Data Sharing Systems. In the following, we discuss
the migration between two different data sharing sys-
tems. It also includes the migration to the portable
cloud architecture. We assume that the user encrypts
data on the client side to prevent the CSP accessing
the data.
One of the major costs includes set up costs, such
as initial set up fees for the new CSP. There are var-
ious sources of costs when transferring data from the
old to the new CSP. First, one or both of the involved
CSPs may have data transfer fees. Second, it might
not be possible to transfer data directly between both
CSPs and the user needs a local data storage to copy
the data. For instance, data formats or databases may
be incompatible, data requires re-encryption, or there
is a lack of APIs to transfer data directly.
Once data is transferred to the new CSP, connec-
tions to old contacts have to be re-established and ac-
cess policies have to be set up. In general, there is no
automatic way to convert the old access policy to a
new system. For this reason, the access policy has to
be verified manually, which can be an expensive and
erroneous process, e.g., due to human errors crucial
data could accidentally be leaked to wrong contacts.
Portable Clouds. For the migration of the portable
clouds, there may be set up and data transfer costs.
Even the small migration downtime for the portable
clouds could lead to further costs.
PortableCloud minimises the cost described
above. Since data can be transferred directly between
the old and the new CSP, expensive data re-encryption
and round trips to the user’s local storage could be
eliminated. Furthermore, PortableCloud ensures that
contacts can still access the shared data and no new
encryption keys have to be exchanged. This not only
minimises the service downtime but also is fail-safe
against human errors, i.e., the old access policies are
re-used at the new CSP.
The user as well as all contacts do not need to up-
date or reconfigure their client software since the mi-
gration process is transparent. This eliminates support
costs and expensive software adoptions.
4.2 Migration Agent
There are various decision making and other tools
that could assist during the migration process (Satzger
et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2010; Khajeh-Hosseini et al.,
2011). Like these tools, we use a migration agent in
PortableCloud. The migration agent calculates costs
based on various parameters of interest, which in-
cludes, but are not limited to, historical growth pat-
tern, manual input or a combination of both. The mi-
gration agent assists users in providing statistics about
data usage, forecasting and listing alternative CSPs
that can offer similar or even better service. If the
agent finds a better CSP, it suggests it to the user as
a migration option. For that, the cloud agent main-
tains a knowledge base of alternative CPSs in real-
time. This knowledge base is updated regularly by
services that host the migration agent.
A core aspect when considering migration of the
portable clouds is cost. The costs identified in Sec-
tion 4.1, e.g., initial set up and data transfer costs, are
taken into account. Another interesting parameter is
the migration time. The migration agent can estimate
how long a migration will take, e.g., how much time
the account set up and the data transfer will take. This
helps the user in estimating when the new service of
the CSP is available.
The migration agent also estimates usage patterns
and notifies a user about possible performance prob-
lems and issues. These problems could be a result of
lacking or surplus of data storage, transfer problems
with the users/contacts, or stability and reliability is-
sues with the CSP. For example, if for a certain pe-
riod of time the user consumes less storage space than
she pays for, the migration agent analyses if there are
more suitable (i.e., economical) options available.
The migration agent also considers factors such as
customer satisfaction, reputation or legal issues with
the CSP. However, these factors are subjective and
have to be considered carefully. Furthermore, the mi-
gration agent helps users to find better service plans
at the current CSP, if available.
5 DISCUSSION
One goal of PortableCloud is to maintain privacy
of users. In this section, we discuss what information
the CSP can gain about the user and what informa-
tion is concealed from the CSP. Moreover, we discuss
requirements and solutions for an enterprise that uses
the portable clouds.
Privacy. There is some general knowledge a CSP
has about its users. For instance, when registering at
a CSP, information such as the user name and login
name, email address, phone numbers, postal address
or payment details may be revealed to the CSP.
All data the user stores at the CSP is encrypted
and can only be read by the user who has the corre-
sponding key. In PortableCloud, the meta data is also
protected. Thus, the CSP cannot learn any sensitive
user data.
Outgoing commands contain the target CSP in or-
der to deliver a command to a certain contact. This
may reveal the identity of contacts. Although all in-
formation about contacts is stored encrypted, the CSP
can derive information about the number of contacts
of a user. To address this issue, Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) (Stefanov et al., 2013; Goldreich and Ostro-
vsky, 1996) or related techniques may be necessary.
The access policy maps access tokens to an ac-
cess control map, which may reveal information to the
CSP. For example, the CSP can analyse how many ac-
cess tokens exist for a certain data entry and may de-
rive information about the number of contacts or the
importance of the data entry.
Enterprises. In PortableCloud, as described above,
users control their data and manage contacts they
share their data with. However, for commercial enter-
prises, this model might not be an ideal option. In the
following, we describe what requirements an enter-
prise may have concerning portable clouds and how
PortableCloud can be customised to fulfil these tai-
lored requirements.
An enterprise usually has a number of employees
and there are certain restrictions on how data can be
shared with internal and external contacts. For this
reason, the enterprise needs a way to manage their
employees. To do so, the enterprise takes the role of
an admin user who can manage a group of users at
the CSP (see Figure 5). The admin user has several
privileges, such as the administration of new users,
i.e., creation and deletion and controlling data access
between users/contacts.
In general, an enterprise can require access to all
data produced by their employees. The enterprise
can require employees to enable their admin access
Figure 5: An enterprise can administrate and manage mul-
tiple users (e.g., its employees). The enterprise may have
special access rights to its employees’ data and key stores.
to their secret key. This would also allow the admin
to reset their secret keys. Since employees only use
their own personal password to encrypt their secret
key (see Section 3.1), the personal password is not re-
vealed to the employer. This is important in case the
employee uses this password also for other purposes.
6 RELATEDWORK
The difficult task of migrating a system to the
cloud has the advantage of being scalable while
having a low maintenance and flexible pricing op-
tions (Zhao and Zhou, 2014). Migrating a local ser-
vice to the cloud can reduce cost to run and main-
tain servers but can also increased the dependency
on external third parties and a deterioration of the
service quality because of less control over the sys-
tem (Khajeh-Hosseini et al., 2011).
For enterprises, it is not easy to decide if a mi-
gration from their IT system to the cloud is benefi-
cial. Cloud Genius assists users in finding an op-
timal CSP that provides IaaS, i.e., it finds the IaaS
that is able to run a certain VM image at better ser-
vice conditions (Menzel and Ranjan, 2012). The
problem of vendor lock-in can be addressed by using
unified programming APIs and domain-specific lan-
guages to model application components and cloud
requirements (Satzger et al., 2013). In a so called
meta cloud, an agent continuously checks for alter-
native CSPs with better conditions for the specified
requirements (Satzger et al., 2013).
One way to share data is to use a distributed peer-
to-peer data sharing system such as PeerDB (Ng et al.,
2003). However, data in PeerDB is not encrypted.
Moreover, for sharing data, both peers are expected
to be online.
Various security and privacy issues in cloud com-
puting have been identified (Takabi et al., 2010). One
way of dealing with privacy issues is to keep users
anonymous while storing the user’s data in cleartext
in the cloud (Khan and Hamlen, 2012). K2C allows
users to share encrypted data with other users but
users have to manage their encryption keys in a local
key store (Zarandioon et al., 2012). A more conve-
nient approach is to store the encryption keys in an
encrypted key store in the cloud (Ferretti et al., 2014).
Even when data is encrypted, it is possible to perform
a search query on the encrypted data while respecting
multi-user access policies (Asghar et al., 2013).
The cloud storage system DepSky (Bessani et al.,
2011) stores encrypted and signed data at multiple
CSPs. DepSky uses a secret sharing scheme (Butoi
and Tomai, 2014), which means that shares of the se-
cret key are distributed on different CSPs. While Dep-
Sky allows users to replicate data at different CSPs, it
does not offer any contact management.
There are various popular cloud sharing systems
available. The cloud software ownCloud6 allows
users to setup a personal cloud server. Data sharing
platforms, such Boxcryptor7, support the client side
encryption. However, these services neither support
migration to another CSP nor do they allow private
data sharing with users of other CSPs.
Mona allows users to share data with contacts and
revoke access if necessary (Liu et al., 2013). While
the identity of contacts is concealed from the CSP,
the user knows about the provenance of the data.
To define an access policy, a simple Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) mechanism can be used. Here,
roles can be granted and revoked if necessary (Sandhu
et al., 1996). Moreover, hierarchical attribute-based
encryption can be used to control and revoke data ac-
cess (Wang et al., 2011).
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK
In this paper, we addressed the problem of ven-
dor lock-in, which makes it difficult for cloud users
to migrate to an alternative CSP because data cannot
easily be transferred to a new CSP and data shared
with contacts at the old CSP may become inaccessi-
ble after the migration. To fill the gap, we presented
PortableCloud, an architecture that makes it possible
to migrate a data sharing system to a new CSP. In
PortableCloud, users can share data with contacts lo-
cated at the same or at different CSPs. PortableCloud
provides mechanisms to store data in an encrypted
manner.
We discussed the cost of migrating a portable
6https://owncloud.com/
7https://www.boxcryptor.com
cloud and various aspects necessary for designing
PortableCloud. We described a migration agent that
assists users in automatically finding a suitable CSP
that could satisfy their needs.
As future work, we plan to complete the imple-
mentation of PortableCloud. We believe that an anal-
ysis of the migration performance will confirm the
feasibility of proposed portable clouds. Furthermore,
investigating accountability aspects of portable clouds
would be an interesting research direction.
REFERENCES
Armbrust, M., Fox, A., Griffith, R., Joseph, A. D., Katz,
R., Konwinski, A., Lee, G., Patterson, D., Rabkin, A.,
Stoica, I., and Zaharia, M. (2010). A view of cloud
computing. Commun. ACM, 53(4):50–58.
Asghar, M. R. (2013). Privacy Preserving Enforcement of
Sensitive Policies in Outsourced and Distributed En-
vironments. PhD thesis, University of Trento.
Asghar, M. R., Ion, M., Russello, G., and Crispo, B. (2012).
Securing data provenance in the cloud. In Open Prob-
lems in Network Security, volume 7039 of Lecture
Notes in CS, pages 145–160.
Asghar, M. R., Russello, G., Crispo, B., and Ion, M. (2013).
Supporting complex queries and access policies for
multi-user encrypted databases. CCSW ’13, pages
77–88.
Bessani, A., Correia, M., Quaresma, B., Andre´, F., and
Sousa, P. (2011). Depsky: Dependable and secure
storage in a cloud-of-clouds. EuroSys ’11, pages 31–
46.
Burr, W. E., Nazario, N. A., and Polk, W. T. (1996). A pro-
posed federal PKI using X.509 v3 certificates. NIST.
Butoi, A. and Tomai, N. (2014). Secret sharing scheme
for data confidentiality preserving in a public-private
hybrid cloud storage approach. UCC’14, pages 992–
997.
De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Foresti, S., Jajodia, S., Para-
boschi, S., Pelosi, G., and Samarati, P. (2008). Pre-
serving confidentiality of security policies in data out-
sourcing. WPES ’08, pages 75–84.
De Chaves, S., Uriarte, R., and Westphall, C. (2011). To-
ward an architecture for monitoring private clouds.
Communications Magazine, IEEE, 49(12):130–137.
Ferretti, L., Colajanni, M., and Marchetti, M. (2014). Dis-
tributed, concurrent, and independent access to en-
crypted cloud databases. Parallel and Distributed Sys-
tems, 25(2):437–446.
Garfinkel, S. (1995). PGP: pretty good privacy.
Goldreich, O. and Ostrovsky, R. (1996). Software pro-
tection and simulation on oblivious RAMs. J. ACM,
43(3):431–473.
Hacigu¨mu¨s¸, H., Iyer, B., and Mehrotra, S. (2004). Ensuring
the integrity of encrypted databases in the database-
as-a-service model. In Data and Applications Security
17, volume 142, pages 61–74.
Joint, A., Baker, E., and Eccles, E. (2009). Hey, you, get
off of that cloud? Computer Law & Security Review,
25(3):270 – 274.
Josefsson, S. (2011). PKCS# 5: Password-Based Key
Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) test vectors. Tech-
nical report.
Khajeh-Hosseini, A., Sommerville, I., Bogaerts, J., and
Teregowda, P. (2011). Decision support tools for
cloud migration in the enterprise. In Cloud Computing
(CLOUD), pages 541–548.
Khan, S. and Hamlen, K. (2012). Anonymouscloud: A data
ownership privacy provider framework in cloud com-
puting. In Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing
and Communications (TrustCom), pages 170–176.
Liu, X., Zhang, Y., Wang, B., and Yan, J. (2013). Mona:
Secure multi-owner data sharing for dynamic groups
in the cloud. Parallel and Distributed Systems,
24(6):1182–1191.
Menzel, M. and Ranjan, R. (2012). CloudGenius: Decision
support for web server cloud migration. WWW ’12,
pages 979–988.
Ng, W. S., Ooi, B. C., Tan, K.-L., and Zhou, A. (2003).
PeerDB: A P2P-based system for distributed data
sharing. In Data Engineering, pages 633–644.
Sandhu, R. S., Coyne, E. J., Feinstein, H. L., and Youman,
C. E. (1996). Role-based access control models. Com-
puter, 29(2):38–47.
Satzger, B., Hummer, W., Inzinger, C., Leitner, P., and
Dustdar, S. (2013). Winds of change: From vendor
lock-in to the meta cloud. IEEE Internet Computing,
17(1):69–73.
Stefanov, E., van Dijk, M., Shi, E., Fletcher, C., Ren, L.,
Yu, X., and Devadas, S. (2013). Path ORAM: An
extremely simple oblivious ram protocol. CCS ’13,
pages 299–310.
Takabi, H., Joshi, J. B., and Ahn, G.-J. (2010). Security and
privacy challenges in cloud computing environments.
Security & Privacy, 8(6):24–31.
Wang, G., Liu, Q., Wu, J., and Guo, M. (2011). Hierarchi-
cal attribute-based encryption and scalable user revo-
cation for sharing data in cloud servers. Computers &
Security, 30(5):320 – 331.
Ward, C., Aravamudan, N., Bhattacharya, K., Cheng, K.,
Filepp, R., Kearney, R., Peterson, B., Shwartz, L., and
Young, C. (2010). Workload migration into clouds
challenges, experiences, opportunities. In Cloud Com-
puting (CLOUD), pages 164–171.
Zarandioon, S., Yao, D., and Ganapathy, V. (2012). K2C:
Cryptographic cloud storage with lazy revocation and
anonymous access. In Security and Privacy in Com-
munication Networks, volume 96, pages 59–76.
Zhao, G., Rong, C., Li, J., Zhang, F., and Tang, Y. (2010).
Trusted data sharing over untrusted cloud storage
providers. In Cloud Computing Technology and Sci-
ence (CloudCom), pages 97–103.
Zhao, J.-F. and Zhou, J.-T. (2014). Strategies and methods
for cloud migration. International Journal of Automa-
tion and Computing, 11(2):143–152.
